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Introduction 
The European Union remains an important but somewhat nebulous actor in international relations. 
Hopes for it to be a global power have not been fulfilled; indeed at times of crisis it often seems 
quiescent (Koenig, 2014). Yet its importance in many spheres of politics and economics is 
appreciated by both allies, and rivals such as Russia (which went to extraordinary lengths to prevent 
Ukraine integrating with the EU in 2013). Clearly, the acutely fragmented nature of the EU is 
responsible for the confusion as to its role and potential (Hill, 1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; 
Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). This article argues that a focus on temporality –in particular the 
different timescapes of its institutions and the social, economic and political changes it implements 
on various scales – helps us to explain the particular irregularities of the EU’s role. Timescape was a 
term developed by Goetz, and Meyer-Sahling to describe the different institutional cycles of the EU 
system (2009). It is a felicitous concept for EU studies in as it captures the complexity, asynchrony 
and differentiation of this entity. The term is expanded on here to go beyond institutional 
timescapes and address the different causal timescapes in international relations:  in critical realist 
terms the different causal complexes and generative structures of international relations (Patomaki, 
2002: 99-122). This expanded concept of timescape offers a lens within which to trace the 
complexity and stratification of the EU’s institutions, policies and action. More specifically the focus 
on temporality allows us to delineate the particular imagined timescape of EU external action as a 
liberal teleological vision, and to critique this with an analysis informed by more historicist and 
complexity-sensitive understandings of international change.  The research rests on a critical realist 
ontology as this historicist and stratified ontology is highly congruent with the timescape concept. 
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As the EU’s salient characteristic is its effort to lead change through social and economic 
interventions, various forms of critical political economy and historical sociology are drawn upon for 
the analysis. The empirical case study is of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is a region which has 
been the subject of extensive multilevel structural diplomacy (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert,  2009) 
on the part of the EU. As the EU is the dominant economic pole in the region it is an apt case study 
of the EU’s efforts to lead change though social and economic interventions. However it is also a 
region which exemplifies the dissonance between the EU’s institutional and structural approach and 
the other ‘realities’ which obtain.  This article offers a holistic analysis and critique of the EU’s efforts 
project. The first section introduces the concept of timescape and elaborates on the critical realist 
and historicist foundations of this approach. The following section elaborates a more specific 
framework for understanding the EU’s external relations timescapes, including its institutional 
timescapes and the causal assumptions (causal timescapes) behind its project. Then the analytical 
and conceptual framework for critiquing the EU’s approach – its liberal structural foreign policy –  is 
outlined. Subsequently the analysis turns to the detail of the EU’s reform and integration project in 
the Mediterranean and the impact of the differentiated timescapes and powers of the EU on its role 
in this region. The disconnects between the EU’s method of incremental development and 
legalisation and the reality of crisis, conflict and revolution came into sharp relief in 2011. The article 
seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the EU by using the timescape concept to elucidate 
precisely how and why the differentiated nature of the EU impacts on its actorness and power. It 
offers a temporal conceptualisation and critique of the EU’s structural foreign policy and the 
assumptions underlying.  It also explains its relative passivity in times of crisis and in so doing 
contributes to the literature on the EU’s crisis management (Boin, Ekengreen, Rhinard, 2013). More 
generally it is also hoped that this article can offer an exemplar of how a more explicit understanding 
of the different timescapes of institutional, socio-economic and political change can help us 
understand contemporary international relations/world politics.  
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Critical realism and the timescape concept 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling et al. used the concept of ‘timescape’ to analyse the multifaceted (internal) 
political dynamics of the European Union. Timescape is defined as ‘how time is institutionalised in a 
political system’, including the institutional processes, the decision-making or political dimension 
and the implementation of policy (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2009). This research agenda involves 
the study of the different temporal frameworks involved and how they interrelate. They argue that 
this temporal dimension is particularly relevant to the EU due to the complexity (the compounded 
nature) of its institutions.  In another contribution to the same issue Bulmer conceives of timescape 
in a much broader sense, as ‘macro-social development’ and a way to consider the various ‘causal 
chains’ in the process of European Integration (Bulmer, 2009: 310), going beyond institutional rules 
and processes to include the timescapes of power and causation in the social world. This is how the 
term is used here. While this is a significant expansion from Speyer-Meyling and Goetz’s original 
definition, the term timescape is still apposite as a broad signification of how temporality interacts 
with other dimensions of reality. The aim is to analyse the actual and imagined causal timescapes as 
well as the institutional timescapes of the EU. This assumes a critical realist ontological position that 
accepts the existence of reality and causation (Archer et al, 1998). This realism is (in the traditional 
philosophical sense) a belief in the causal impact of social (historical) structures, emphasising that 
these exist independently of our individual consciousness (Joseph, 2007: 345-359). There is a danger 
that this can lead to a determinist approach but its open systems approach accepts that, given the 
fluidity and interconnectedness of social systems, the outcomes are not determined and individual 
agents can still have a causal impact (Patomaki: 117-120; Kurki, 2007: 361-378). Contrary to more 
relativist schools, critical realism does not accept that there is no reality or truth which can be 
perceived, even if it cannot be entirely apprehended. However, it is also to be distinguished from 
any positivism as it accepts the reflective nature of social knowledge (it recognises that we need to 
interpret and explain) and it looks for causation occurring beyond the level of the individual and the 
 [Type text]  
formally provable. It is thus highly congruent with the philosophy of historical sociology more 
generally (Lawson, 2007: 357-358).   
 
Critical realism’s open, historicist and stratified approach is recognised as fruitful for the field of 
International Relations (Patomaki, 2002; Wight and Patomaki, 2000: 213-237), and it lays the 
conceptual underpinning for the following analysis of EU timescapes. Historicism refers to the 
rejection of the belief that there are universal laws in history, arguing for ‘the time and space 
dependence of causal mechanisms...which cannot be reduced to universal regularities,’ (Steinmetz, 
2010: 234). As such historicism allows us to delineate macro-timescapes (patterns of causation 
related to different periods of history). In the field of IR the historicist turn emerged in response to 
the a-historical, neo-realist vision of international relations, developed by Waltz, which posited core 
causal factors and laws (namely anarchy and its consequences) as determining features of the 
international system (Lawson, 2007; Waltz, 1979). For example, Robert Cox emphasised the 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic reasoning: synchronic focusing on problem solving at 
a given point in time and diachronic taking a longer view (incorporating changing structures) (Cox, 
1983).  On a more focused level the different forms of historical institutionalism (Pierson, 2004) also 
embody historicist principles.  
 
Apart from the general principle of historicism, the related concepts of stratification and emergent 
properties, offer a framework for understanding the complexity of contemporary causal patterns. 
The notion of ‘emergent properties’, originating in evolutionary science (Hodgson, 2005: 899-914)., 
refers to the fact that over time an entity can emerge with its own structures, causal mechanisms, 
and dynamics, which are not reducible to the sum of its parts. Stratification implies that our complex 
social reality includes different levels of causation (due to the phenomenon of emergent properties 
over time). On a more applied level, this historicist recognition of complexity and stratification is also 
relevant to our understanding of power, the fundamental concept of international relations and 
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politics. As there is no homogenous immanent logic across time and space power does not have one 
monolithic source or form (be it military or economic). This provides the basis for a more ‘multi-
factorial’ conception of power (Mann, 1986: 1-33; Lawson, 2006: 481-482). For example Mann’s 
study of the operation and evolution of power in human societies divines four primary sources of 
power: political, military, ideological and economic, and these networks of power are ‘overlapping 
and intersecting’ in distinct forms in specific historical epochs (Mann, 1986: 1-33).  This 
understanding of society as stratified, including different levels of causation and power, allows us to 
conceive of it in terms of different causal timescapes operating at different levels. 
 
Bates presents a framework for understanding the temporal complexity of causation, going beyond 
the dualist tendencies of social scientists to reduce it to the agency-structure dichotomy or a linear-
cyclical dichotomy (Bates, 2006: 143-161). For a richer understanding Bates advocates a ‘circadian’ 
conception of time, in which multiple temporalities coexist. This is based on the example of nature in 
which biological entities’ internal biological rhythms and linear life time are linked to macro time-
cycles, namely the earth’s rotation around the sun. This model of a multitude of interconnected 
temporalities is clearly relevant to the social world also, although the naturalistic methodology could 
be misleading (as the harmonious and self-supporting dimension of the natural temporal processes 
may not apply). Here Bate’s conceptualisation chimes with Hutchings arguments as to the 
heterotemporality of world politics (Hutchings, 2008). These different temporalities can also be 
understood, in the socio-political world in terms of different causal timescapes at play. Causal 
timescapes may also be understood in terms of Patomaki’s ‘causal complexes’, the set of 
components (including agents and structures) which cause various outcomes (Patomaki, 2002), 
although this particular framework is not applied here. In brief, critical realism offers a meta-
theoretical underpinning for an approach that incorporates explanation and interpretation; and 
provides the ontological basis for a much fuller application of the timescape concept developed by 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling. In particular its principles of complexity and stratification, allows for an 
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ontology that understands and explains the social world in terms of various causal timescapes. The 
rest of this article will apply this to how the complex and differentiated external actions of the EU.  
 
Timescapes of the European Union’s structural foreign policy 
The institutional timescapes relevant to EU foreign policy and external relations, include the various 
internal political and institutional cycles discussed above, but also the EU’s institutionalisation of 
time in the policies it forms with other countries/regions. The broader, causal, timescapes (the 
temporal frameworks of the changes it seeks to inspire), are understood in terms of the EU’s liberal 
structural foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014; Holden, 2009). Let us start with the 
institutional timescapes of the European Union, as outlined by Goetz (2009). At the most basic level 
for example, we have the permanent bureaucracy and legal system, the 5 year cycle of the 
leadership of the Commission and the Parliament, the 2 ½ year cycle of the President of European 
Council and the High Representative, an average 4-5 year cycle for national political leadership, a 7-
year budgetary framework and so on. Goetz and Meyer-Sahling argue that this temporal dimension 
is particularly relevant to the EU due to the complexity of its institutions and that these timescapes 
may be a reflection (an effect of power relations) or a cause in themselves in certain instances (2009: 
327–328). A starting point for their discussion is the assumption that the EU institutions (legal 
framework and the Commission, Council bureaucracy) operate on linear time, whereas the political 
time of states is cyclical (Goetz, 2009: 206–208). Goetz and Meyer-Sahling’s work builds on the path-
breaking work of Ekengren who argues for the cyclical character of EU time (Ekengren 2002: 
143).They argue that EU time (as a whole) has a stronger linear character (Goetz 2009: 218) and in 
any case transcend the simple linear-cyclical dichotomy (in line with Bate’s ontology).  
 
EU external policy making includes all of the various timescapes involved in EU politics and policy-
making in general. It involves ‘real-time’ instruments (demarches, diplomacy, sanctions, security 
interventions) as well as the embedding of structural changes.  In terms of the timescapes of its 
 [Type text]  
institutionalised relationships they are again ‘linear’ in terms of permanent legal structures and a 
direction of ever greater interdependence/closer cooperation which is supposed to be insulated 
from contemporary political pressures, and cyclical in their operations (joint-institutions meeting at 
regular intervals).  The EU’s outside interlocutors, have to consider an intricate array of timescapes 
which may affect their economic and political relations: 
European Parliamentary elections and Commission leadership appointments. 
Appointments of the High Representative and President of the European Council. 
Elections in member states and the short-term political logic of national decision-makers in 
general (Ekengreen, 2002: 147-148). 
The linear legal and institutionalised structures should, in theory, provide direction and consistency 
to the relationship, in the face of all of these multileveled changes. While critical of the EU, outside 
powers do appreciate its consistent, long-term role in global public policy issues (Morini, Peruzzi and 
Poletti: 37-38; Fioramonti and Olivier, 2010: 110). On the other hand, the EU’s challenges in dealing 
with immediate crises have been comprehensively diagnosed (Boin, Ekengreen, Rhinard, 2013; Pohl, 
2014). 
 
Let us now turn to the deeper question of causal timescapes, beginning with the EU’s conception of 
these. The EU form of foreign policy or external relations has been mostly focused on legal, social, 
and economic change. As such it has often been conceptualised in terms of civilian power and 
normative power (Maull, 2005; Manners, 2006). EU enlargement for example, a process of gradually 
integrating neighbouring states, has been described as its greatest foreign policy success (Solana, 
2007). The EU focus on deep legal, economic and social structures (now accompanied by more 
traditional diplomatic/security instruments) was labelled structural foreign policy/ structural 
diplomacy (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert,  2009). These terms capture the sense which the EU’S 
foreign policy objectives are dependent on long-term structural change (although the means of 
achieving this are not always clear). The EU is seeking to effect social-economic, geo-economic, 
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geopolitical and ideational change. It is attempting to shape the legal/regulatory structures of the 
collective economy and the terms of exchange (trade law), broader social and economic structures, 
as well as political and geopolitical structures.  Substantially, this is a foreign policy supporting liberal 
globalisation (Holden, 2015), albeit one skewed by European values and interests (Wade and 
Meunier, 2010). Economically this involves supporting free trade, investor rights and the private 
sector in general. 
 
The core features of the EU’s foreign or global policies here are its support for legalisation (Kahler, 
2000) in the international sphere. For example, the EU has been consistent in its support for legally 
binding international agreements on climate change. In forming the WTO the EU insisted on a 
stronger more permanent dispute settle mechanism than had been the case. Legalisation is both a 
repudiation of traditional realist world views and, potentially, an exercise of deep structural power, 
as laws are effectively a society’s genetic code which shapes how it evolves in the future. A related 
feature of EU policy is the institutionalisation of political and economic relations, primarily an 
investment in the future.   ‘Developing’ countries are the focus of the EU’s structural foreign policy. 
In many ways the concept of development (itself replete with teleological undertones) encapsulates 
the EU’s attitude. Development in contemporary parlance implies a peaceful process of change, 
quite different from the historical ‘development’ of European and North American states. The EU 
presents itself as a major partner in this process (Olivier and Fioramonti, 2010; Holden, 2015: 10-12).  
 
The causal timescapes implied in the EU’s structural foreign policy are not always explicit. What is 
proposed are a complex series of economic, institutional, social and political changes on a set of 
different geographical scales and time-scales. As outlined in the following section on Euro-
Mediterranean integration there is an implicit chain of cause and effect (although the sequence is 
not always clear) in which reform supports development which leads to political change and greater 
interdependence.  It should be noted that the macro-causal timescape is based on a liberal (and to 
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an extent teleological world view):  institutions, legal agreements and EU-supported reforms create 
a framework for better relations and strengthened market forces, in which market forces lead to 
prosperity, together with other reforms they support civil society, liberal plural societies. There are 
also wider macro-level assumptions that globalisation, in terms of the acceleration, expansion and 
intensification of transational economic interactions, will continue, thus helping to supersede local 
politico-economic power blocs.  
 
A critical framework for analysing the timescapes of EU foreign policy 
Thus the EU has been trying to lead a transnational process of change but the impediments to its 
success are many. Challenges include the various disconnects within its own institutional timescapes, 
between these timescapes and those of its partners, difficulties in acting coherently at key moments 
of change, as well as more fundamental challenges to its vision. In regard to the first two 
impediments or challenges, the institutional timescapes and the interaction with outsiders, a 
relatively simple empirical analysis will suffice to investigate these. The third challenge is essentially 
a question of crisis management and will be explored in the analysis of the EU reaction to the Arab 
Spring. Exploring the last, most fundamental, ‘challenge’, which refers to the differences between its 
imagined timescapes of change and the timescapes of reality, requires a stronger theoretical context 
as it requires a counter-theory of how causation occurs in global politics. The argument, as already 
implied, is that the EU’s imagined timescapes are based on a liberal historical worldview. The specific 
causal assumptions relate to the impact of trade and free markets on economic growth and the 
impact of economic growth on broader social and political phenomena.  
 
One stark counter-position is provided by the historical materialist thesis that the internal 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, would eventually lead to a ‘crisis of 
accumulation’. Marxist thought has often been in dialogue with the (non-Marxist) Kondratieff who, 
writing in the 1920s, postulated regular cyclical phases (of approximately 50 years) in global 
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capitalism: an upswing – a wave of accelerated investment/profitability/growth –followed by a 
downswing with reduced investment, rate of profit etc. (Day, 1976: 68).  The concept of ‘cycles’, 
with its implication of relatively regular changes has been controversial (Mandel, 1975: 126-135). 
Trotsky argued that change was much more ‘spasmodic’ (Day, 1976). Mandel combined 
Kondratieff’s concepts with Marxist and historical analysis to delineate the 1970s as the beginning of 
a period of ‘late capitalism’ in which the capitalist system could no longer contain its contradictions 
(1975).   David Harvey also argues that capitalism having reached its geographic limits, and the limits 
of financial engineering, is reaching its final limits (Harvey, 2014). The implications of this framework 
for the EU’s structural foreign policy are clear: its trade and integration policies will not lead to 
sufficient growth. Rooted in Marxist thought, and dealing more explicitly with temporality in 
geopolitics as well as geoeconomic, is the World Systems Analysis/WSA approach. This focuses in 
particular on the ‘the rise and fall of large polities and pulsations in the spatial extent and intensity 
of trade networks’ (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 2015: 190). Central to its analysis is an acceptance of the 
Kondratieff theory and the rise and fall of great powers. WSA’s primary exponent, Wallerstein, takes 
a relatively Marxian view of capitalist globalisation, arguing that a systemic crisis is imminent 
(Wallerstein, 1995: 25-46). Again the implications for the EU’s project are dire.  
 
 
If historical materialism offers temporally conscious theoretical frameworks its ideological tenets 
mean that the failure of the EU is over-determined. The analysis here will draw on historical 
materialist concepts but the major analytical framework is based on the looser more heterodox 
theories of Susan Strange. She offers an implicitly historicist understanding of the structures of the 
global political economy, which she subdivides into finance, production, security and knowledge 
(bringing in the element of reflexivity). An over-riding theme was the role of public power (states) vis 
a vis markets (different elements of the private sector). Strange was a critique of the concept of 
globalisation, because the contemporary increase in the power of transational capital was initiated 
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by one state, the US, and transnational capital still had a strong geographical power base (Strange, 
1986). Thus she understood the increased structural power of transnational capitalism as a specific 
historical moment rather than a ‘natural’ evolution (as a liberal or Marxist would, in different senses). 
Strange did not follow the historical materialist thesis of the inevitable implosion of capitalism. 
Rather her arguments can be understood as a Polanyi-esque critique of pure free market capitalism 
(Polanyi, 2001), with a particular critique of the financialisation of the global economy (Strange, 
1986). A major emphasis was on how the hyper time of the financial markets has overwhelmed the 
regular production and exchange economy.  Strange’s ideas offer a more open template for 
analysing the EU’s structural foreign policy. Her outline of the different structures of the global 
economy (not limited to the four major structures cited) offers a pluralistic framework for analysing 
the causal timescapes (which can be understood as the unfolding of direct and structural power in 
the world). Strange does not presuppose any regularity either in terms of teleological or cyclical 
development, but can help us analyse how changes in the global economy with the power of agents, 
to shape change in the world. Of particular note here is the EU’s considerable structural power over 
production and exchange within its own orbit compared to its power over financial and security 
developments. 
 
When it comes to the specific question of domestic social and political change, historical sociology 
approaches offer an alternative to the liberal modernisation theory inherent in many Western 
policies. Historical sociologists take a long-term approach to studying how state and societies 
interrelate, including the impact of transnational economic and social factors (Halliday, 2005; 
Hinnebusch 2014). They emphasise the role of path dependency, the continued relevance of pre-
established institutional dynamics and economic patterns. As such they offer a lens for 
understanding how change occurs beyond the linear political liberalisation/democratisation 
continuum. As outlined in the following sections this is particularly relevant to the case of the 
Mediterranean/Middle East. 
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The EU’s structural foreign policy: a case study of the Mediterranean 
The Mediterranean has been defined as a particular geopolitical and economic region (as opposed to 
a purely geographical one) by the EU since the 1970s. As such, due its obvious geopolitical 
significance for the EU (which has expanded to include most of the Northern shore) it has been a 
major focus for the EU’s foreign policy (Bicchi, 2007). In the post-1989 era, EU policy-makers became 
increasingly concerned with a wide range of threats (Ibid: 131-148). The non-EU controlled 
Mediterranean shore was a region riven by conflict and replete with other forms of instability.  There 
are numerous causes of this instability (for example the post-colonial legacy is evident in the Israeli-
Arab and the Western Sahara conflicts). One factor (seized upon by the EU) is the problematic 
process of economic and social modernisation in the Arab states in question. Lack of economic 
development, and partial economic reforms, had left an array of states suffering from a formidable 
range of social problems including unemployment, poor habitation, low educational standards and 
high levels of poverty (European Commission, 1994: 427). The wave of democratisation begun in the 
1970s had not reached these countries. They formed part of a greater Middle East region 
characterised by Fukuyama as one of the ‘empires of resentment’ on the margins of the inexorably 
expanding liberal international community (Fukuyama, 1992: 235-236). Thus the Mediterranean 
Partner Countries/MPCs were challenged in terms of political as well as economic legitimacy. 
 
The EU’s proposed solution to this was a classic case of structural foreign policy: integrate the states 
in question into the liberal international community by leading a new modernisation and 
liberalisation process (Youngs, 2002). Since the 1970s it had established trade and cooperation 
agreements with the states, this was revitalised in the Renovated Mediterranean Policy of 1990  and 
a much more ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was agreed in 1995 to develop the 
relations in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Table one outlines the policies, institutions 
and the participating states).  Given the powerful economic gravitational pull of the EU in this era, 
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aspirations towards a leadership role on the EU’s part were not entirely unrealistic (White, 2001). 
The economic sphere was to be the driving force, this was where most resources would be allocated 
(new aid programmes to help reforms) and where the most ambitious, specific and legally binding 
agreements would be applied (Marino, 2011). As a part of the EMP the EU signed Association 
Agreements with each of the states. These provided for free trade (on a staged 14-year period) and 
future economic integration. The broader aim was a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, in line with 
the development of the global multilateral trade system. The agreements also provided for ‘the 
development of democracy and the rule of law within the political systems’ of the partners 
(Barcelona Declaration, 1995) in line with the EU’s gradualist approach. Institutions were established 
to monitor the process of change and develop it further. Allowances were made for standard 
diplomatic cooperation, and aid of different forms was provided, but the major force for transition 
was the long-term impact legal frameworks providing for economic and social interaction and hence 
modernisation.  Introduced in 2003, the European Neighbourhood Policy built on these pre-existing 
policies and relationships. It provided a more explicit path for integration with the EU (if not full 
membership) laying methods and processes for the adoption of EU laws and regulations. These 
frameworks were supplemented by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2009, which was more of a 
joint institution (Gillespie and Bicchi, 2011).  In short, the overarching logic behind the EU approach 
–which can be fairly gleaned from the framework documents (Holden, 2009: 50–55) – was that 
reform coinciding with and inspired by integration with the EU, would promote economic 
liberalisation and development, gradual political liberalisation and more stable, friendly, states in the 
Mediterranean region.  
 
The institutional timescape for Euro-Mediterranean relations conforms to the general model 
outlined above. The legal agreements provided a linear, if incremental, track of long-term reform 
and integration. Institutional cooperation to manage this process would take place on a cyclical basis 
(regular meetings of the various bilateral and multilateral institutions). This, mostly low-level 
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cooperation, was intended to be insulated from the ebb and flow of international relations. It would 
be led on the EU side by the EU’s permanent bureaucracy in the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat. Generally, although the Commission would lead the implementation of policies (and its 
rotating leadership would not alter its basic posture), the resources available to the Commission 
would be determined by intergovernmental processes (the 7-year budgetary framework for 
example) and in the final instances the political support of the member states would be needed for 
the various carrots and sticks to work.  
 
Table 1 The Euro-Mediterranean institutions 
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The basic causal timescapes involved in this liberalisation/modernization and integration vision are 
clear. In practice the causal chains between the various desiderata: economic reform, trade opening, 
structural economic change, economic and social development, social and political pluralism are less 
clear. Figure 1 reconstructs the causal timescapes based on the EU’s ‘logic of intervention’ (a phrase 
which comes from aid evaluation discourse). The trade agreements should lead to immediate (or at 
least very short term) reforms of the economy and the state in certain respects as should the aid 
projects funded by the EU. Other activities would begin a gradual process of explicitly political 
reform, where practical (low scale forms of political aid should support civil society groups and 
modest reforms with willing governments). In the medium term the economic reforms, and the 
pressures of increased trade should lead to a stronger private sector. Combined with increased flows 
of FDI (due to its access to the EU market) this should lead to socio-economic development, 
including social and human development more generally (better job prospects, environmental 
quality, education, living standards and so forth). In turn this will support greater interaction, 
interdependence with Europe and other outside societies. Parallel to this will be broader processes 
of social cultural change including a change in state culture (greater transparency in how it operates) 
and business culture (less reliance on patronage). In the longer term this should lead to a fully 
market-based society with political pluralism. This would emerge due to the gradual dismantlement 
of the patrimonial or rentier state (Schwartz, 2008), in favour of market forces, and the rise of a 
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Figure 1 The EU’s logic of intervention in MPCs 
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The obstacles to the success of the EU’s vision were manifold and cautionary notes do not have to 
rely on hindsight. Let us isolate three logical challenges. Firstly, even if the ‘neoliberal’ assumptions 
about unbundling authoritarian blocs are – in the long-term – valid, will the EU’s set of institutional 
timescapes be adequate to implement this in the face of different geopolitical forces and agents?  
Secondly, how will the different timescapes, on different scalar planes, reinforce each other as 
planned? (In particular will global forces reinforce the EU’s regional drive). Thirdly, and more 
fundamentally, the liberal/neoliberal assumptions about economic, social and political change can 
be, and were, challenged. 
 
The timescapes of Euro-Mediterranean relations in practice: 1995 to 2011 
The EU agreed legal and institutional arrangements with nearly all of its proposed partners. 
Association Agreements were signed, which provided for free trade in goods (after a transition 
period) and regular institutional contact at different levels (see table 1), including meetings between 
permanent officials and political leadership. These provided the institutional support for the kind of 
developmental process envisaged by the EU. On the European side the Commission provided a 
strong degree of continuity. The EU’s structural policies in tandem with global forces had a real 
impact, with a significant increase in trade and in investment flows. Reforms of legislative and 
administrative frameworks did take place, often focused on the external dimension of the state 
(reforms of customs procedures for example). Syria, the last country to agree, initialled an 
Association Agreement in 2008 (this was later derailed by events). Progress towards the broader 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area also continued. The rules of origin provisions in the bilateral 
trade agreements were expanded to promote greater intra-Arab trade. Relatively high levels of 
economic growth were recorded in most of the Mediterranean partners, and those that were most 
enthusiastic also received foreign direct investment boosts. 
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The institutions and long-term processes engendered by the EU did offer a degree of insulation from 
the headwinds of regional and global geopolitics. EU relations were able to proceed, for example, 
with Morocco – which implemented its trade agreement and signed numerous further agreements, 
seeking its advanced status – throughout a period of very difficult relations with the Spanish 
government, including an incident in 2002 when the two countries came close to armed conflict over 
Persil/Leila Island (Holden, 2009: 78-81). The variegated political timescape of the EU led to more of 
a challenge and gave policy a more staccato nature than would have been ideal. It was Spain’s own 
Presidency of the EU that gave a kick-start to the initial Euro-Mediterranean Partnership( Bicchi, 
2007: 164–167). Other political and geopolitical cycles gave rise to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which was never a political success (Ibid : 175–178)). Developments within French politics 
gave rise to the Union for the Mediterranean Project, which in its initial conception would have been 
a major challenge to the Euro-Med process (Gillespie, 2011). However the Commission and other 
member states were able to reign in the original ideas. 
 
It could not of course remain completely insulated from real-time geopolitics. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in particular spilled over to contaminate regional relations. This need not have been 
disastrous, as there was also scope for sub-regional and bilateral cooperation.  Other events would 
impinge more sharply on the EU’s vision. The attacks of 9.11 resulted in a new geopolitical 
dispensation which saw direct American relational power brought to bear on the region. This had 
unhelpful consequences for the EU’s gradualist approach and the invasion and subsequent civil wars 
in Iraq greatly damaged stability. The War on Terror more generally led to the EU member states 
focusing much more on immediate security concerns (terrorism) than the long-term security 
approach implicit in the EU framework. This need for strong short-term security relations took the 
wind out of the sails of the transformation agenda. These political and geopolitical cycles meant that 
the EU institutions never fully embodied the weight and political force of the EU’s constituent parts 
in their implementation of the reformist/integration project. 
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More generally, the EU’s approach neglected historical sociological insights regarding the social and 
political history of the state or the agency of existing political elites within the MPCs. Essentially the 
EU institutions managing the Euro-Mediterranean relationship took an apolitical approach to 
structural change, while the regimes in question retained their capacity for agency. Said regimes had 
accumulated enormous political, economic and social power in the decades before the EU launched 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. While they made discursive commitments to liberal economic 
reform, as well as human rights and democracy (within the Barcelona Declaration and the various 
bilateral legal agreements), they retained all of their instruments and freedoms to interfere in the 
integration and reform process which, the EU had announced, was calculated to gradually unravel 
the roots of their own hegemony. It was obvious that the political regimes in question would not 
wish to do this (Schlumberger, 2008: 634-635). It had been well documented that there are 
numerous means for governments to distort or take advantage of liberal reforms (Ibid; Dillman, 
2001; Hellman, 1998: 203-234). The most obvious example of this is when privatisations are 
manipulated in favour of regime allies, thus maintaining the politicised neo-patrimonial economic 
structure in different forms. In essence the EU acted as if it were dealing with a ‘blank slate’ and 
failed to consider the role of pre-established political dynamics, and the historical interaction 
between political and socio-economic change. This failure to take the specific domestic internal 
structures into account, and to fully marshal its own political leverage, rendered its long-term vision 
insipid.  
 
The interpellation of geopolitics and the diffusion of EU interventions in complex endogenous 
institutions were not in itself fatal to the long-term reform project. However, to accentuate these 
problems the macro-timescape had not unfolded according to the EU’s vision. It is true that the EU’s 
push for trade liberalisation and reform was supported/reinforced by the US, the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the WTO etc. All of which encouraged the shrinking of the state and the 
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liberalisation of the economic and society. However, other global economic cycles in the 21st century 
were not in sync with the neoliberal project. A dramatic spike in commodity prices, including oil and 
gas, partly fuelled by the development of the Chinese economy, gave some governments, notably 
Algeria, new resources to resist liberalisation. The so-called global rebalancing, in which various 
Southern countries grew substantially, also made new economic partners and sources of funding 
available to MPCs (Woods, 2008). Generally, while globalisation (broadly understood) proceeded, 
the western-led global regulatory project went askew. The WTO failed to agree a new round of 
liberalisation in Doha, while the continued success of China championed a new form of illiberal 
developmental state, which practiced capitalism and traded widely without embracing liberal 
institutions in any sense. Lastly the volatility of global markets would impinge on the gradualist 
process hoped for. The spike in global food prices of 2008 led to very dramatic socio-economic crisis 
in many states (Bush, 2009). The global financial crisis also affected MPCs through reduced demand 
for their products and reduced investment exacerbating unemployment problems. 
 
Furthermore, European integration and the EU’s capacity for action would be gravely undercut by 
the vicissitudes of global capitalism, which was increasingly more ‘spasmodic’  than ‘cyclical’. 
Generally, the EU had never shaped the rhythms of private financial institutions in the same way 
that it shaped European production and trade. The speed and intensity of financial transactions was 
one of the motors of globalisation and it dragged the EU along in its wake (Strange, 1988: 106-110). 
The financial crash in the United States in 2008, morphed into a sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 
2010 as various Eurozone states came close to bankruptcy due to the scale of public sector or private 
sector debt. These crises rose in intensity and took on a systemic level due to the widely perceived 
deficiencies in the Eurozone system. The roots of this crisis can also be understood in terms of the 
EU’s asynchronous political and economic timescapes and its teleological view of time. It has 
become a truism that the problem with the Euro was that currencies were integrated but economic 
and fiscal policy was not. While it may have been assumed that the required integration would come 
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in practice the task of catching-up and creating the collective common resources and institutions 
required has been enormous, as the historical institutionalists implied sequence can be 
determinative (Bulmer, 2009: 309-310). Thus the ‘moment’ of the Arab Spring was met by a 
European Union depleted in terms of economic capital and political energy. 
 
At the most fundamental level the logic of the EU’s model of development was shown to be awry. 
The notion that free trade and liberal reforms would result in both a stronger private sector and 
positive socio-economic changes was not borne out by reality.  The economic changes it led had not 
in most cases  spilled over to significant political liberalisation, neither had the broader social and 
institutional changes occurred. Indeed the form of development promoted by the EU increased 
inequality and little progress was made with the core socio-economic conditions of the population. 
The major features of the socio-economic cycle were the youth bulge (combined with a growth in 
unemployment (youth and graduate unemployment in particular) and urbanisation (UNDP, 2002: 
36-37). While the EU’s economic policies may have helped economic growth, this was entirely 
inadequate to deal with these challenges. In Egypt, for example, despite impressive GDP growth, 
poverty rates had increased (Amin, 2014: 393). In justification of the EU’s approach it has been 
pointed out that Tunisia, the country which led the process of change within the region was the 
state which had integrated the most with the EU. Accordingly, the events can be seen as a 
verification of the EU’s structural modernisation policies (Zank, 2011). However the nature of the 
‘Arab Spring’ was far from the gradual modernisation and liberalisation sought by the EU, and what 
happened afterwards gave confirmation that the region was not headed on a liberal trajectory. It is 
clear that while the EU had some impact it could not shape to a sufficient degree the ongoing socio-
economic and socio-political cycles in the partner countries. Even for businesses, the core 
stakeholder in this policy arena, studies have shown that the business cycle of Mediterranean 
enterprises was not affected by the evolution of trade and financial cooperation (Canova and 
Schlaepfer, 2014). In summary it is clear that whatever the institutional achievements of the EU, its 
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vision was out of sync with the timescapes of change in the region and it lacked the structural power 




The ‘Arab Spring’ was not the kind of controlled transition that emerged in Latin America, or even 
the messy but (mostly) peaceful popular upheavals that occurred in Eastern Europe. The Arab Spring 
uprisings were bloody, uncertain in their outcome and soon led to civil wars and geopolitical conflict. 
The timing of the actual revolts took everyone by surprise. For the previous three decades policy-
makers and academics had outlined the threats facing economically stagnant regimes of dubious 
legitimacy (Zoubir, 1999; European Commission, 1994). Yet the authoritarian regimes of the region 
had demonstrated substantial durability. While the ingredients of revolt were there, social science 
has little capacity to predict when the critical mass of revolution will ignite. Globally the recent wave 
of democratization appeared to be on the turn, with resurgent authoritarianism in Eastern Europe 
and the developing world. The EU seemed to be losing its interest in democratization (Cavatorta and 
Pace, 2010) as did the US under Obama. The events of the Arab Spring transpired rapidly: a form of 
spontaneous spillover which offered an evocative contrast with the EU’s legalistic presence. During 
the dramatic events in Tunisia and Egypt the EU was quiescent. Its representatives did rhetorically 
support the rights of the protestors, without taking any action to support them. Effectively, it was a 
bystander (Viilup, 2011), although this was the case for other international actors also. In regard to 
Libya (a different kind of revolution), and Syria, the EU remained a minor player, while the traditional 
military powers came to the fore.  
 
The relative inactivity of the EU in the moment of revolution was unsurprising but once, in Tunisia 
and Egypt at least, significant change had taken place; there was an opportunity for the EU to 
increase its role. The EU had important leverage given the extreme economic vulnerability of  the 
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states concerned (Springborg, 2011: 427-423). The EU did assume an immediate role in coordinating 
a European and international response ((Boin, Ekengreen, Rhinard, 2013: 1). Nevertheless its 
reaction lacked initiative and purposefulness. Concerning economic and social relations, it was 
political figures from EU member states who led with initiatives (Viilup, 2011: 1). The major initial 
collective reaction the EU as a bloc could muster was a defensive move in relation to migration. 
Greater financial support was indicated later in the year, The Commission provided 700 billion in 
extra-funding for the ENPI (European Commission, 2013; 3), together with a modest set of proposals 
to upgrade the EU’s policies (European Commission, 2011: 303). The EU’s standard way of thinking 
reasserted itself and its strategic response was embedded in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. The logic to this approach was that these were countries in ‘transition’, a 
state for which the ENP, and implicitly the EU’s general approach towards accession countries, 
would prove relevant (High Representative and EC, 2012). The 2012 document elaborated on the 
transition challenge, noting the need for differentiation between states and discussed the various 
(non-aid) forms of partnership and knowledge-sharing that could be undergone. Some political 
acumen was shown in the recognition that  ‘The sequencing of reforms is highly context-dependent 
and a balance has to be sought between "quick-win" reforms that serve to maintain the political and 
social momentum and to retain popular support for the entire process and for longer-term reforms’ 
(ibid). However, the general framework of transitology did not bode well, with its teleological 
assumptions and unwarranted optimism (Heydemann, 2014: 311-313). Furthermore the ENP itself is 
an unrealistic template in which all futures lead to Brussels, or at least an alignment with Brussels. It 
mimics the enlargement model without offering accession (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 797). 
The unreality of the EU’s approach was thrown into sharp relief as many of the transitional societies 
were marked by increasing geopolitical turmoil.  
 
This tendency towards long-termist liberal policies (that side-step inconvenient ‘real-time’ problems) 
is most evident in its approach to economic relations. Here the major initiative announced was to 
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initiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (which followed on logically from the ENP). 
The DCFTAs were to achieve regulatory convergence in ‘sanitary and phytosanitary rules (SPS), 
animal welfare, customs and border procedures, competition and public procurement’. (High 
Representative and European Commission/EC 2011b: 8-9). Apart from Morocco, there has been a 
lack of enthusiasm to commit or even discuss such regulatory harmonisation (European Commission, 
2014: 15). This form of integration is out of kilter with global politics, where developing countries 
have increasing resisted regulatory harmonisation (in the WTO). Even assuming that the 
assumptions about the beneficial effects are correct they could not possibly materialise in the short 
to medium term and would take a long time to agree (Witney and Dworkin, 2012:  64). That this is 
the major vector of the EU’s economic relations at a time of such political and geopolitical 
turbulence is illustrative of how its long-term structural template leads to unrealistic approaches.  
In reviewing the EU’s reaction to the Arab uprisings, it should be noted that a range of other actors 
(the US, international organisations and so forth) failed to have a significant positive impact on 
developments. However, the EU is the dominant economic pole in the region and could have been 
expected to play a larger role. Also there was much more at stake for it than more distant actors.  
 
Conclusion 
The EU’s self-image as a global power is based on its economic weight and structural relationships; 
and its future potential more generally. The Mediterranean is a classic example of the EU’s long-
term approach and its ultimate weakness as a force for change.  It constructed an elaborate reform 
and integration relationship with (most) states of the region; a long-term structural policy which was 
overlaid with other policies and relationships. Such structural policies were challenged by the agency 
of entrenched authoritarian regimes and sometimes undermined by various elements within the EU. 
Meanwhile the structural policy’s assumptions about broader socio-economic developments at 
different scales proved inaccurate. As it stands the EU was engrossed in relatively superficial 
legal/institutional processes as volatility in the region grew. The EU was quiescent during the 
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eruption of popular uprisings in 2011 and its primary economic reaction to the new dispensation has 
been legalistic, long-termist and unrealistic. The EU’s failure is a failure of power in different senses. 
Its reaction to the crisis showed a limited capability – limited power as an agent – to influence events. 
However, it also signifies the failure of its deeper structural foreign policy. The vision of development, 
both domestic and global, implicit in the EU’s strategy has been shown to be out of sync with other 
domestic and global causal timescapes while the EU lacked the structural power needed to shape 
the economic, financial and social dynamics. 
 
The explanation here is quite specific, as it focuses on one particular region. However, the insights – 
in particular the incongruence between the complex patterns of real causation and the EU’s 
teleological discursive timescapes – are relevant to other areas. Eastern Europe has witnessed the 
very real result of the EU’s structural diplomacy interacting with volatile contemporary realities.   
Of course the fact that reality unfolds differently to an entity’s plans is hardly newsworthy. However, 
the EU is especially problematic (relative to a state), because of the complexity and dissonance of its 
timescapes and the structures they seek to marshal; while its particular sequence of internal 
development creates additional pressure. In the EU’s case there is a particularly stark dissonance 
both between its differentiated institutional timescapes and between its liberal causal timescapes 
and the reality of economic and geopolitical cycles of change. This explains the nebulous nature of 
the EU as an international actor. Those looking to the European Union as either a great power or a 
force for progressive change are likely to remain disappointed. To paraphrase De Gaulle’s famous 
put-down of Brazil in the 1960s: ‘the European Union has great potential, and it always will’. Beyond 
the case of the EU, there is room for much more in-depth research on timescapes at several levels of 
international relations and world politics. This research agenda could include more rigorous analysis 
(including quantitative data) of the different institutional timescapes of given actors and their 
interaction with productive, commercial, financial and geopolitical cycles. More generally a critical 
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realist informed focus on temporalities offers a framework for combining congruent work in 
different social science disciplines to explore the multiple causalities of the international system. 
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